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We face many tough issues including poverty, climate change, social 
and economic inequality, the cost and quality of education and healthcare, 
stagnant wages, financial market instability, disease, and food security. 
Despite the existential threat that these concerns may raise, there is no 
consensus on whether or how to address them through regulation, taxation, 
or other government policy tools. Private enterprise, however, has 
tremendous potential to address these issues through technology, wages, 
supply chain maintenance, green operations, efficient delivery of goods 
and services, and a myriad of other outputs and outcomes. 
In the U.S., the potential of the private sector to address these issues 
dwarfs that of the government. The 2015 federal budget was 
approximately $2.5 trillion (excluding transfer payments like Social 
Security), while the 2015 gross domestic product (GDP) was about $18 
trillion. While numbers go up and down, total government spending 
(including state and local) typically accounts for about 20% of GDP when 
transfer spending is netted out. Consumer and business spending account 
for the other 80%. In light of these realities, harnessing the assets of the 
private sector is a critical pathway towards addressing pressing social and 
environmental issues. 
However, the structure we use to allocate resources in the private 
economy actively precludes using assets in this manner. What I want to do 
here is describe the structural issue and how a new corporate governance 
model—the benefit corporation—can help to restructure our system of 
capital allocation. But we require more than a mere adjustment to 
corporate governance. I want to suggest that everyone along the 
investment chain, from corporate executives and directors to fund 
managers and individual investors, add an ethical component to their 
decision-making. I do not mean to suggest altruistic investing. What I am 
suggesting is that there is a better way to invest for private gain—one that 
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will potentially produce a better outcome for all participants in the 
economy, including investors. The ethical principle is easy to state: 
investors and managers should not seek gains by simply extracting as 
much value as possible from the economy, but instead should seek gains 
by building and sharing value with all stakeholders in their investments. 
In other words, we need to restructure our system to encourage the 
investment of private capital in positive sum opportunities. 
The current rules for allocating private capital are based on the idea 
of “stockholder primacy” and the pursuit of immediate increases to share 
value, which have become identified with a pre-governmental pure “free 
market.” As Robert Reich points out in his recent book, Saving 
Capitalism,1 there is really no such thing. There is no free market without 
rules that are created and enforced by government and social mores, and 
those rules affect outcomes. The rules in place today pit the interests of 
investors against those of other stakeholders rather than linking them. This 
is actually a fairly new construct and not a universal one. Pushing the 
market in a different direction—one that links the interests of all 
stakeholders—will return the U.S. to the model of stakeholder capitalism 
that prevailed after World War II. This model would deliberately allocate 
capital in order to create value for society as a whole, thereby addressing 
critical social and environmental issues. It would return U.S. capitalism to 
a system based on making rather than taking. 
 
*     *     * 
 
We have to change the misconception that investors are best served 
by managers who attempt to “maximize stockholder value” while being 
neutral concerning all other stakeholders affected by their decisions. John 
Kay provides a comprehensive description of the mechanisms that allocate 
capital in his recent book, Other People’s Money,2 and I have borrowed 
his terminology. Kay describes the channels that allocate the savings of 
individuals to deposits and investments, which are then used to fund 
capital needs, including businesses investment and home mortgages. The 
investment channel directs a large portion of these assets into stocks and 
bonds, often indirectly through mutual and pension funds, insurance 
companies, and other institutions. A large part of that allocation goes to 
corporations and other limited liability entities, some publicly traded and 
some owned by small groups of investors. 
The huge public markets garner most public awareness. For 2015, 
the market capitalization of U.S. public companies was more than $26 
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trillion. That number, however, considerably understates the total value of 
the assets that those companies control because they are funded by debt, 
as well as equity. (If the markets are working reasonably well, the value 
of a corporation’s total assets will roughly equal the aggregate value of its 
debt and equity.) As Kay describes, the investment channel serves several 
roles critical to a capitalist economy: it finds funding for new long-term 
investments, it provides stewardship for funds already invested, and it 
allows savers to store and transfer wealth, both within their lifetime and 
between generations. These functions are largely performed through 
financial intermediaries, including banks, brokers, pension funds, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, and other institutions. These 
institutions control roughly 70% of the U.S. stock market. In essence, they 
“own the economy,” to quote commentators James Hawley and Andrew 
Williams.3 
Each participant in the chain of investment has an up-the-line 
obligation to invest the funds in a manner that has the best balance of risk 
and return available. Pension fund managers look to maximize the value 
of their beneficiaries’ contributions in order to ensure that pension 
obligations will be met and future contributions will be minimized. They 
hire investment managers who are charged with earning the best return 
they can on a risk-adjusted basis. Those managers in turn select stocks and 
expect the directors of the individual companies selected to maximize the 
return of the corporations on whose boards they serve. Not only do the 
managers select stocks, but they also choose directors and vote on other 
matters in order to fulfill their stewardship role. Again, this chain of 
investment and stewardship is governed by the upstream obligation of 
each manager: the directors have duties to stockholders, and the 
investment managers have duties to their beneficiaries, the savers, and the 
policyholders who are the ultimate source of the funds. These duties 
require that the fiduciaries manage the assets for the benefit of the 
investors and not for their own benefit or the benefit of anyone else. 
These obligations come from a combination of laws, regulations, and 
customs that evolved in response to the growth of large corporations with 
many stockholders beginning towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
The separation of asset ownership from control of large amounts of assets 
created a concern that corporate officers and trustees would use the assets 
for their own benefit. This creates a classic agency problem: finding a way 
for the investor-principals to monitor the agent-officers without expending 
too many resources. Fiduciary duties are one solution we use to address 
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the agency problem in the investment chain. These duties require 
fiduciaries, such as corporate directors, to be careful and loyal but also 
give them almost complete discretion to make decisions within those 
parameters. In many ways, this model serves us well. There is plenty of 
opportunity for the managers to creatively manage capital with the threat 
of fiduciary challenges mitigating the risks of misappropriation by agents. 
However, with the passage of time, these duties have been strictly 
interpreted to require the fiduciary to consider only the interests of the 
equity investor. Custom has followed suit, and the role of investment 
managers and corporate officers has become generally understood to be 
creating value for stockholders. This has created an unintended collateral 
effect: the manager that controls the assets must ignore the best interests 
of all other stakeholders in the investment enterprise, including workers, 
customers, and communities. In today’s capital markets, this doctrine of 
“stockholder primacy” pervades the rules that govern the investment 
channel from top to bottom. This simple rule may solve the agency 
problem, but it creates a huge “stakeholder problem.” 
 
*     *     * 
 
It may help to consider some examples. Mutual funds, public and 
private pension funds, and other institutional investors, along with 
individuals and others, own Exxon-Mobil, Apple, and General Electric. 
These institutions control enough stock to elect the directors. The directors 
hire the CEOs. The CEOs make strategic decisions. They decide where to 
drill, how to commercialize technologies, how carefully to monitor the 
practices of suppliers, and what businesses to acquire or divest. These 
decisions have enormous implications for society. 
Following fiduciary principles, the asset managers invest in order to 
maximize their return, and the company managers in turn steward those 
investments to maximize returns to their stockholders. The metric used to 
measure this return is stock price and capital return (dividends, 
redemptions, and merger payments). And while it might be imagined that 
the long-term stock price is more important than the short-term price, 
economic theory (in the form of the efficient market hypothesis, which 
posits that stock prices reflect all available information) and financial 
practice (in the current focus on short-term performance) often measures 
stockholder return based on actual stock price rather than hypothetical 
future prices. 
This dynamic has certainly played out in the current stock market. 
There is a great deal of stockholder activism based on raising stock prices 
in the immediate term, which often is accomplished by reducing expenses 
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to raise earnings, even if those expenses may create value in the long term. 
While there are certainly disputes as to whether this is a fair description of 
what is happening in some or all activist campaigns, there is no question 
that directors are beholden to stockholders through both corporate voting 
and fiduciary law. For today’s markets, the strongest indicator of 
stockholder return remains the current stock price. 
However—and this is a critical point—even if directors try to reject 
the short-term model and forgo immediate profits in order to create longer 
term value, that value must be for stockholders only. Under prevailing 
practice in the U.S., it is not the ultimate purpose of corporations and the 
mandate of corporate directors to benefit workers, communities, or 
customers—only the stockholders. This trope was famously expressed by 
Milton Friedman in 1970 in the New York Times Magazine article titled 
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.4 And 
although the corporate law of the time may not have endorsed that 
statement, today’s corporate law certainly does. Cases decided by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in the last two decades of the twentieth century 
state very clearly that the sole beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties 
are the stockholders. 
I want to be clear. This fact does not prevent for-profit corporations 
from doing a lot of good or acting for the benefit of the different 
stakeholders, as long as those actions in turn benefit its stockholders. And, 
of course, treating customers, workers, and the community ethically and 
committing to do so can be an excellent strategy for creating stockholder 
value, particularly over the long term. Any such commitment, however, is 
contingent on the conduct continuing to benefit the stockholders. In 
practice, directors generally have very broad discretion under the business 
judgment rule to decide when such stakeholder commitments are 
beneficial to stockholders, but there must be a connection. Moreover, 
when it comes time to sell the company there is no long term for 
stockholders. As a result, directors are not allowed to take the interests of 
workers, customers, or other stakeholders into account in a sale—they 
must simply sell to the highest bidder, and there are dozens of Delaware 
corporate cases reinforcing this point. 
But is there anything wrong with that? Don’t we want the free market 
to find the best use for capital by finding its most profitable use? This 
question, however, is based on an assumption that has no factual support: 
that high profits to the capital provider is a proxy for the efficient use of 
capital. The obvious flaw in that assumption is that capital may be used in 
a manner that shifts costs to other stakeholders—creating “negative 
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externalities.” Such a use of capital may provide profit to common 
stockholders, but a negative return to society (think about a use that 
includes a lot of pollution). Relying on stockholder primacy to address 
agency costs imposes a different cost: it requires asset managers to play a 
negative-sum game with other stakeholders, if that game will give the 
investors the greatest return. And, in the “free market” created by 
stockholder primacy, each available value-destroying profit opportunity is 
pursued until equilibrium is reached. 
But, it is not simply bad for the economy overall. In the long run, 
stockholder primacy hurts the stockholders themselves. Why? First, 
stockholder primacy restricts the ability of corporate managers to employ 
strategies of commitment that would actually increase long-term value for 
stockholders. Colin Mayer, a finance professor at Oxford University, 
explains this phenomenon in the book Firm Commitment.5 Mayer shows 
that an entity that employs the share value maximization principle destroys 
its own long-term value. He argues that when someone deals with a 
corporation bound by stockholder primacy, they know that any 
commitment the corporation makes is contingent on either legal 
compulsion or continuing value creation for stockholders. This 
contingency creates antagonism and legalistic relationships that deter the 
creation of durable long-term value with trusted partners. The following 
passage from Firm Commitment provides the example of inducing 
employees to make valuable commitments when a company cannot 
commit back: 
If there is an active labour market and it is easy for them to obtain 
alternative employment at any time, then it is the firm not the 
employees which is exposed. The employees have made no 
commitment, whereas it may be costly for the firm to train new 
workers every time that an existing one resigns. Now it is the 
potential employees who would like to be able to demonstrate 
commitment to gain employment but are incapable of doing so on 
their own. The firm offers a means of achieving this. It can do it 
financially by delaying payment of their wages, thereby making it 
costly for them to depart prematurely before the firm has recovered 
its investments in training them. Alternatively, it can encourage 
commitment by making employment in the firm a valued attribute in 
its own regard, reflecting strong employee affinity with the goals and 
values of the organization. Critical to both forms of control of firms 
over their employees is their corresponding trust in the firm—trust 
that the firm will not expropriate their deferred payments by, for 
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example, engaging in reckless investments and trust that it really will 
uphold the values to which it aspires. That is why the balancing of 
commitment and control in the firm is so vital to its successful 
operation.6 
Unfortunately, any commitment to that better business model is 
contingent under stockholder primacy. So when entering into a 
relationship with a community or customer, a corporation is unable to 
make a deep commitment, a fact that is known to the other party. Lynn 
Stout, in her book, the Shareholder Value Myth,7 describes the problem as 
a conflict between current (“ex ante”) stockholders and their future (“ex 
post”) selves. The ex ante stockholders want the upfront value of 
committing, while the ex post stockholders want to get even more value 
by defecting: 
There is an inevitable conflict between shareholders’ ex ante interest 
in “tying their own hands” to encourage their own and other 
stakeholders’ firm-specific contributions, and their ex post interest in 
opportunistically trying to unbind themselves to unlock capital and 
exploit others’ specific contributions. This conflict—a conflict 
between shareholders’ ex ante selves and their ex post selves, if you 
will—puts public corporations governed by the rules of stockholder 
primacy at a disadvantage when it comes to projects that require  
firm-specific investments. Rejecting shareholder value thinking, and 
instead inviting boards to consider the needs of employees, 
customers, and communities, allows boards to usefully mediate not 
only between the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, but 
between the interests of ex ante and ex post shareholders as well.8 
In fairness, I must point out that Professor Stout makes this argument 
in support of her argument that stockholder primacy is not the current law; 
while I agree wholeheartedly with her policy analysis, I do not believe the 
case law supports her. I will discuss these cases later. 
Even more critically, stockholder primacy destroys the ability to 
build value in other companies. Large institutional owners end up owning 
most of the market in order to be sufficiently diversified. Small asset 
owners (such as 401(k)s) would be wise to have the same diversification 
through the ownership of diversified mutual funds. The returns of such 
broad owners (“universal owners”) are reduced when the existing 
corporate law regime actively encourages the managers of a huge portion 
of our economy to dump negative externalities onto the system in order to 
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“create value” for their individual companies. For these investors 
(including most of the savers atop the investment chain), the most 
important factor in the return they receive is not whether they can beat the 
market by finding individual companies that outperform—instead, the 
most important factor is how the market performs. It is estimated that 
general market performance (“beta”) contributes about 80% to a 
diversified portfolio’s performance while particular choices (“alpha”) 
contributes only 20%. Companies that create systemic risks and costs are 
likely to damage the market in its entirety. This is precisely what the 
financial sector did by chasing individual returns in the mortgage market, 
leading to the financial crisis, which hurt the stockholders of all 
companies, to say nothing of the dislocation and costs suffered by 
homeowners. 
These two points—the value of commitment in a single corporation 
and the importance of universal ownership—are closely linked. The 
creation of value through commitment to stakeholders highlights a critical 
distinction in methods for creating stockholder value. One way is simply 
to obtain as much profit as legally possible, whether that profit comes from 
creating value in the world or from simply extracting value from other 
stakeholders. Thus, a company guided by stockholder primacy might 
switch to a cheaper fuel that increases its carbon footprint in order to 
increase its profits. However, that company has not really created  
value—it has just taken value from everyone else (by increasing climate 
risk) in order to achieve a short-term profit. In contrast, a company that 
practices stakeholder values would be more likely to save money by 
increasing efficiency and lowering its carbon footprint. Furthermore, a 
company that could commit to internally accounting for carbon costs is 
more likely to earn the trust of communities, consumers, and workers, 
thereby creating shared, real value. 
Thus, the shared, real value created for a company through 
stakeholder commitments is much better for a universal owner because 
that value is more likely to benefit its entire portfolio. In contrast, investing 
in a corporation that might maximize its own value by exporting negative 
externalities is a losing game for diversified investors, as well as for the 
system as a whole. So universal investors should, as a general rule, prefer 
holistic value maximizers, not chasers of individual advantage. But it is 
not just about portfolios. Savers also care about the world they live in. The 
practice of stakeholder values will contribute to the value of the other 
forms of capital that savers depend on—their own human capital, the 
natural capital of our planet, and the social capital of a peaceful and just 
society. Stockholder primacy requires companies to ignore these crucial 
forms of capital that we all rely on. 
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Common sense tells us that investors should want corporations to be 
able to pursue these value-maximizing strategies, but the current 
investment paradigm precludes it. The system through which we allocate 
most of our productive capital actively encourages businesses to “create 
stockholder value” by heaping costs and risks onto the system—onto their 
own owners—in preference to actually building value. This benefits no 
one, except short-term players who siphon value from the rest of the 
economy. 
How did we get to this irrational place? Stockholder primacy is a 
relatively recent development. Although stockholder primacy as a means 
of addressing the agency problem was debated for much of the late 
twentieth century, the prevailing sentiment appeared to lean toward 
stakeholder, not stockholder principles. In 1951, the chairman of Standard 
Oil could describe corporate managers with no thought of stockholder 
primacy: “The job of management is to maintain an equitable and working 
balance among the claims of various directly affected interest 
groups . . . stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.”9 
No hedge fund manager would be satisfied if the chairman of  
Exxon-Mobil were to take such a position today, but the view prevailed 
during the years of post-war prosperity to the great benefit of anyone 
broadly invested in the U.S. economy. Reich describes the change as 
follows: 
In fact, in the first three decades following World War II . . . . [t]he 
large corporation was in effect “owned” by everyone with a stake in 
how it performed. The notion that only shareholders count emerged 
from a period in the 1980s when corporate raiders demanded [that] 
managers sell off “underperforming” assets, close factories, take on 
more debt, and fire employees in order to maximize shareholder  
returns.10 
The story of stockholder primacy’s ascendance is complex. It 
involves the collapse of the postwar monetary agreements, the 
globalization of the capital markets, and the influence of economic theory 
typified by Milton Friedman, but also championed by the law and 
economics movement. But the Delaware courts provided the capstone for 
the model of stockholder primacy with a series of decisions in the 1980s. 
These cases held that corporations exist primarily to generate 
stockholder value. Accordingly, the nation’s most important corporate law 
jurisdiction viewed the maximization of stockholder wealth as the primary 
indicator of whether directors are complying with their fiduciary duties. In 
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1985, when Revlon tried to defend itself against a hostile takeover by Ron 
Perlman, arguing that the takeover would hurt bondholders, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that directors owe their duties to stockholders only. 
Further, because the directors had decided to sell the company, there was 
no “long run” for the stockholders. Therefore, immediate stockholder 
wealth maximization had to be the sole objective for directors, even if 
Perlman’s high bid might destroy large amounts of bondholder value (or, 
by extension, worker or community value). In his academic writings, the 
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a reading of the 
Delaware case law consistent with the stockholder primacy model and has 
summarized it with the following proposition: “[T]he object of the 
corporation is to produce profits for the stockholders and . . . social beliefs 
of the managers, no more than their own financial interests, cannot be their 
end in managing the corporation.”11 
As a result of these developments, our capital is now allocated to 
work against our interests. In a chapter written for the Cambridge 
Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, Raj 
Thamotheram and Aidan Ward provide a chilling example of how this 
thinking leads companies to act in a manner that hurts all investors: 
What is the price of a bee? And more generally, where does the 
extinction of bee populations—and with bees much of agriculture as 
we know it—fit into discounted cash flow and other investment/risk 
decision-making tools? The simple answer is that they don’t. 
To summarize, the scientific case that one class of pesticides, 
neonicotinoids, are particularly dangerous to bees is now very clear 
(Maxim and van der Sluijs 2013). . . . [T]he biggest producers of 
these chemicals . . . have also played leading roles in the powerful 
industry push back against regulatory action. Already too late, the 
industry has persuaded some supportive governments to back further 
delay (Jolly 2013). . . . [T]he role of investors is very important but 
hidden. Investors incentivize corporate management to worry (much) 
more about shareholder returns than helping to cause a form of 
ecocide that could be economically disastrous for asset owners and 
their members. In addition, investors show no real stewardship 
activity to counterbalance the effect of company management who 
use shareholder money to lobby for what is not in the real interests of 
the end-beneficiaries.12 
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*     *     * 
 
This stockholder primacy model was the structure under which I 
practiced law for twenty-six years. As a partner at a Delaware law firm, I 
worked on preferred stock financings, IPOs, mergers, hostile takeovers, 
proxy contests, corporate governance, and fiduciary issues. My practice 
was based on some fairly simple rules and principles. Directors are elected 
by stockholders and have the full authority to manage the corporation once 
elected, but must do so prudently and unselfishly to create a financial 
return for stockholders. 
That basic structure—stockholder-elected directors manage the 
corporation, but must do so carefully and loyally for the financial benefit 
of the stockholders—underlies nearly every question that comes up in 
corporate law disputes. The stockholder primacy paradigm drove much of 
the advice I gave to clients. While corporations could certainly be good 
employers and valuable resources to the community, that was not their 
raison d’etre—corporate law was about creating value for the 
stockholders, who owned the corporation and elected its managers to 
oversee their investment. For corporate lawyers, these are simple, 
nonideological facts. They view the corporate form as a brilliant legal 
technology that allows entities to raise large sums of money from 
disaggregated investors, who can diversify their investments across many 
entities, allowing corporations to take risks and create value. The 
underlying ethos is that investors are willing to risk their capital with 
complete strangers because they know that there is a system in place to 
protect them: elected directors who are obligated to be loyal to 
stockholders. Agency problem solved. 
A few years ago, when I was chairing the Delaware Bar committee 
(the Council) that recommends changes to the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, we were approached by B Lab, a nonprofit organization 
that works to make business a force for good. Among other projects, B 
Lab certifies companies as being good corporate citizens (like a Fair Trade 
mark for corporations). B Lab has two requirements for  
certification—first, the company must meet a strict standard of social and 
environmental performance; second, the company must have a corporate 
governance model that mandates good corporate citizenship. For 
corporations, however, that second aspect violates the stockholder 
primacy model central to traditional corporate law. Thus, B Lab was 
lobbying state legislatures to adopt a statute they had drafted called the 
Model Benefit Corporation Law (MBCL). The MBCL contains a number 
of provisions that require corporations to follow a stakeholder model. 
When a state adopts the MBCL or similar statutory provisions, 
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corporations created under that state’s general corporation law can opt into 
the new provisions and become “benefit corporations.” 
In Delaware, our reaction to B Lab’s proposal was far from positive. 
The corporate bar was very comfortable with the way that corporate law 
worked and cognizant of the tremendous value the corporate form had 
produced over time. Even progressive corporate lawyers, who believed 
that corporate behavior with respect to social and environmental issues 
was problematic, did not think those issues should be addressed by 
changing corporate law. Instead, there was consensus that those issues 
could be better addressed with laws and regulations that protected society 
and the environment—better to allow the free market for capital to work 
its magic, find the most profitable (and therefore most productive) use, and 
let the government regulate any bad behavior. 
However, the Council was encouraged by the Governor and the 
Secretary of State to undertake a review of the concept, particularly in light 
of Delaware’s national leadership in corporate law and the growing 
interest in the benefit corporation movement. With the assistance of B Lab, 
members of the Council met with entrepreneurs and investors who 
championed the concept. As a result of this process, the Council 
determined that Delaware ought to offer businesses the ability to operate 
in the form of a benefit corporation. In 2013, Delaware adopted a statute 
allowing corporations to opt in to a structure where the duties of directors 
extend beyond stockholders to include all stakeholders. I was personally 
convinced and became one of the drafters of the Delaware’s benefit 
corporation statute, eventually giving up my partnership. I am now Head 
of Legal Policy at B Lab. 
 
*     *     * 
 
Benefit corporation legislation has now been adopted in thirty-two 
U.S. jurisdictions, as well as Italy, and is being considered elsewhere. 
There are approximately 4,500 benefit entities (a few states authorize 
benefit LLCs, in addition to corporations) in the U.S. For the most part, 
these entities are small companies without significant outside investment. 
There are, however, a significant number that have raised money from 
venture capital funds and other professional investors. These investors 
include some of the most well-known venture investors—Founders Fund, 
Benchmark Capital, Andreessen Horowitz, and Union Square Ventures. 
Some of these companies are doing quite well and will be candidates for 
IPOs in the not-too-distant future. One KKR-backed company, Laureate 
Education, has already filed its registration with the SEC in anticipation of 
going public. Laureate is a massive for-profit higher education company 
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with more than $4 billion in annual revenue and campuses in twenty-eight 
countries. 
We are, then, at an inflection point. State legislatures, including 
Delaware, have created a new path for the investment channel to  
follow—the $26 trillion in public company equity capital can, through 
IPOs and conversions of traditional companies, begin to be applied to 
enterprises that work to build value for all stakeholders. Whether this will 
happen is a critical question and a policy debate we ought to be having. 
Most public companies are currently required to measure their success by 
one metric: stockholder value. There is no room under the stockholder 
primacy model for a corporation to credibly commit to long-term social 
and environmental responsibility, even if doing so could potentially 
produce value for the corporation on a risk adjusted basis and that behavior 
would overall benefit its investors because of their diversity of interests. 
Yet tens of trillions of dollars of our economy are controlled under this 
counterproductive construct. As a society, we would clearly be better off 
if some or all of this capital was deployed under benefit corporation 
principles, so that directors could choose the path that was best for all 
stakeholders—or could at least consider all stakeholders in the mix. 
The policy question is whether the introduction of benefit 
corporation law, by giving corporations an opportunity to reject 
stockholder primacy, is sufficient to address our current issues of capital 
allocation. The model is optional, and investment managers must be 
convinced that investing in stakeholder values will satisfy their duties to 
their beneficiaries. Remember that I earlier referred to two levels of 
fiduciary relationships: director to stockholders and asset managers to 
beneficiaries. The stockholder value model infects both the latter and 
former. Asset managers compete on the basis of short-term returns. This 
is understandable. Current and past financial performance seems like the 
only reliable financial metric available. Moreover, the efficient market 
hypothesis, which posits that stock price reflects all available information, 
provides intellectual support for such a metric. However, even if current 
stock prices were a valid indicator of company performance, it is important 
to emphasize that this is an irredeemably flawed measuring stick for 
diversified investors because it ignores the effect of company performance 
on portfolio performance. 
We have to change both investing concepts and the understanding of 
fiduciary law as applied to investment fiduciaries. Briefly, the problem is 
that Modern Portfolio Theory is still the dominant investing theory and 
managers follow it because they believe that following the dominant 
theory protects them from liability. In his article, The Time Has Come for 
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a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in Investment,13 Jay Youngdahl 
makes this point in clear language: “[L]awyers tell trustees that the trustees 
will be sued and ‘lose their house’ if they deviate from the Wall Street 
model.”14 This is exactly the line that I have heard from pension fund staff. 
Youngdahl goes on to quote Steve Lyndberg of Domini Social 
Investments as to the damage done by contemporary investment models: 
[T]he dominant theory of investing today, Modern Portfolio Theory, 
is based on a definition of success that fails to acknowledge the extent 
to which investments at the portfolio level can affect the overall 
financial markets . . . . [T]he benefits that accrue from the practice of 
this theory are at best part of a zero-sum game and available to only 
a limited number of investors.15 
The law and theory are aggravated by the fact that asset managers 
are compensated based on “beating the market,” or at least not trailing it, 
so that they are forced to take this short-term approach of investing in 
companies that increase share price by assaulting the system. We need to 
stop compensating asset managers in this fashion. We need to make sure 
that the fiduciary rules that govern asset managers are clear about this. And 
we need investor fiduciaries to start thinking like benefit corporation 
directors. 
*     *     * 
 
The good news is that there is every reason to think that the ultimate 
capital providers—you and I, through our pensions, 401(k) plans, 
insurance policies, and other investments—have the right incentive to 
insist on a model where investment managers take a long-term, broader 
market view of their obligations. We want the market to rise long-term so 
we can pay for college, fund retirement, and retain the wealth we have 
built for our children or others. Moreover, we want a peaceful, vibrant, and 
thriving society located on a healthy planet. These desires all counsel that 
we look for investments that build shared and durable value, rather than 
chase short-term gains and impose negative externalities. 
Many individuals in the investment community understand these 
concerns. Principles for Responsible Investment,16 a sustainability 
initiative affiliated with the United Nations, now has signatories 
worldwide with $59 trillion under management. The initiative 
                                                     
 13. Jay Youngdahl, The Time Has Come for a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in 
Investment, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115 (2011). 
 14. Id. at 117. 
 15. Id. at 125. 
 16. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, https://www.unpri.org/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5RNZ-USU9]. 
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promulgates six principles intended to lead investment fiduciaries to 
integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into their 
investment strategies. The organization describes its commitment as 
follows: 
As institutional investors, we have a duty to act in the best long-term 
interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary role, we believe that 
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can 
affect the performance of investment portfolios . . . . We also 
recogni[z]e that applying these Principles may better align investors 
with broader objectives of society.17 
Forward-looking asset managers, like CalPERS,18 which manages 
$300 billion of pension assets for California’s public employees, 
understand the issue, as illustrated by a statement from their investment 
beliefs: “As a long-term investor, CalPERS must consider risk factors, for 
example climate change and natural resource availability, that emerge 
slowly over long time periods but could have a material impact on 
company or portfolio returns.”19 
Hermes Investment Management, a well-known U.K. pension 
advisor, is very clear about the broad concern of universal owners and the 
unsustainability of negative-sum strategies: 
Most investors are widely diversified; therefore it makes little sense 
for them to support activity by one company which is damaging to 
overall economic activity. . . . [I]t makes little sense for pension 
funds to support commercial activity which creates an equal or 
greater cost to society by robbing Peter to pay Paul.20 
In addition, recent guidance from the Department of Labor has made 
it easier for private pension plans to include ESG factors into their 
investment models, and some interpret the advice as allowing such plans 
to consider the effect of the investments on pensioners’ quality of life 
beyond the health of the plan. In another intriguing development, the 
influential Robert Eccles and Tim Youmans of Harvard Business School 
have embarked on a project to collect statements worldwide from boards 
                                                     
 17. The Six Principles, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, https://www.unpri.org/ 
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https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/calpers-beliefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3UK-
HLT7]. 
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of directors to identify the stakeholders material to the corporation, what 
their interests are, and how the board weights them. The project is 
conceived as a direct response to the prevailing ideology of stockholder 
primacy. 
Despite these positive developments, investment and corporate 
practice are still overwhelmingly dominated by the short-term, individual 
company perspective. Just read any financial publication or watch a 
business news channel. Even asset managers that sign on to PRI principles 
continue to compensate their portfolio managers on short-term, alpha 
metrics. Moreover, while the movement toward corporate social 
responsibility is admirably growing, this movement often seems to 
emphasize the direct value that individual companies achieve through 
responsible and sustainable practices—money saved through green 
initiatives, improved employee performance resulting from enlightened 
employment practice, etc. There is a palpable fear about openly 
committing to sharing value with other stakeholders; it just seems 
unbusinesslike. But, as I have tried to show, there are entirely sound 
reasons from the investor perspective for incorporating stakeholder values, 
whether it is increasing stock value by permitting real stakeholder 
commitment, increasing portfolio value by decreasing systemic costs, or 
improving the lives of beneficiaries by preserving the environment. We 
should not be embarrassed that doing the right thing creates value. 
But, perhaps this all sounds a bit pat. Can investors really improve 
the lives of others with no sacrifice? What are the trade-offs? It is too easy 
to just assume that increased value for investors and stakeholders always 
converge, correct? Well, no and yes. No, for the reasons already addressed. 
By moving toward stakeholder values, the investment channel allocates 
assets to uses that create more value overall. By taking negative-sum 
opportunities off the table, the stakeholder model creates more aggregate 
value for stakeholders and stockholders to share. Thus, we should expect 
that eliminating stockholder primacy can enhance value for all parties, 
thereby solving the “stakeholder problem.” It is just math. 
But in one very significant way, consistent application of stakeholder 
values will take away a profit opportunity for investors—the opportunity 
to free ride. In a world where most of our capital is being invested in a 
responsible and sustainable manner, all investors would benefit from the 
good behavior. In such a world, there would continue to be opportunities 
to create value in the negative-sum way, because a bit of pollution or one 
lousy supply chain is not likely to greatly affect the market or portfolios 
of the investors. So, corporate management may be tempted to “cheat.” 
Investment managers may be tempted to seek out the cheaters so they can 
free ride on the beta updraft while getting a little extra alpha for 
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themselves. Each individual investor may feel that its best strategy is to 
look for extractive value, whether or not most investors do so. And, as long 
as our investment rules permit such activity, there is a real concern that 
profit seekers will feel constrained by competitive pressure to seek out 
these opportunities until equilibrium is reached, taking us back to 
stockholder primacy. 
As I noted at the beginning, 80% of our capital assets are allocated 
through the investment channel and subject to this dilemma. Our public 
policy discussions focus on the government’s role in addressing social 
issues, but the government only allocates 20% of our capital. We must 
have a public discussion that allows us to establish ethical investment 
principles enforced by laws and custom. Benefit corporation law is an 
excellent start, but much more needs to be done. I have addressed a number 
of opportunities that stockholder primacy denies to savers including the 
building of value based on genuine trust and commitment; the 
rationalization of broad portfolios so that their components are not wasting 
resources in a negative-sum game; and a portfolio that makes a positive 
contribution to all aspects of savers’ lives, not just their bank accounts. 
An honest appraisal of these opportunities has to recognize that they 
exist on a spectrum, not in discrete categories, and that there is not even 
strict separation between these opportunities and the sorts of goodwill and 
reputational value available to conventional corporations and investors 
today. At the same time, public policy influencers must recognize that one 
key concept underlies all of these opportunities: the shared benefits of 
driving capital to build positive value for all stakeholders. The best way to 
navigate this admittedly fuzzy landscape is to adopt a set of rules, 
including fiduciary law all the way up the investment chain that 
acknowledges that all stakeholders matter. It is simply too hard—and too 
dangerous—to determine when selfish negative-sum behavior might be 
better for the stockholders of a single corporation. By replacing 
stockholder primacy with stakeholder values up and down the investment 
chain, we can minimize the “costs” to stockholders of addressing the 
stakeholder problem. This rule will efficiently push us towards the correct 
side of the spectrum and also address the free rider problem. 
This brings us to the ethical principle stated at the beginning: 
investors and managers should not seek gains by simply extracting as 
much value as possible from the economy, but should instead seek gains 
by simply building and sharing value with all stakeholders in their 
investments. There must be a commitment at the investor level, similar to 
the management level in a benefit corporation, to seek out stock value only 
by building real value. Investors and market participants that play by 
different rules need to be shunned and shamed. Integrating this ethic into 
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the financial system is a beginning, not an end. Corporate and investment 
managers, as well as investors themselves, will have to do the hard work 
of figuring out where the value enhancing opportunities are, even though 
there will be disagreement on the importance and weight of various 
stakeholder interests. But, in order to at least get all that capital working 
in the right direction, we have to change the basic rules. Companies and 
investors must stop competing to take and start competing to create. 
 
